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INTRODUCTION 
Jennifer Daskal’s Borders and Bits1 accurately describes one of 
the core challenges regarding jurisdictional law in the twenty-first 
century: electronic data—everything from e-mails and text messages to 
Facebook and Instagram posts to Twitter pronouncements to drone 
warfare data to search algorithms to financial transactions to cloud 
data storage—travels around the globe with little relationship to 
physical territory. In addition, all of this data is often in the custody 
and control of data intermediaries such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, 
Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, private military contractors, and so on. 
Three important consequences flow from this ubiquitous 
technology-enabled, data-driven global societal activity. First, the 
territorial location of data becomes increasingly arbitrary and 
substantively unimportant.  If I, as a U.S. citizen based in Maryland, 
have a g-mail account and Google, a U.S. corporation, decides to store 
my archived e-mails in Ireland or France or Indonesia (or indeed to split 
up the data fragments that make up each e-mail message among data 
warehouses in all three countries), that decision seems irrelevant to any 
question of whether I have somehow affiliated myself with any of those 
communities or governments for purposes of jurisdictional or choice-of-
law analysis. Second, because of this deterritorialization of data, it will 
often be the case that territorially based courts (or law enforcement 
authorities generally) are unable to easily enforce their decisions 
because those decisions require cooperation from relevant actors in far-
flung communities. Third, as a direct result of the first two problems, 
governmental and judicial authorities are increasingly turning to 
multinational corporate data intermediaries to carry out and enforce 
their orders because only those companies have sufficient global reach 
to make legal rulings effective. But deputizing these intermediaries to 
become enforcement agents, while logical and possibly effective, raises 
new problems regarding the scope of governmental authority and the 
distortions involved in privatizing law enforcement.  
1. Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018).
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Daskal’s article does an excellent job of summarizing recent 
cases that raise these issues and effectively teasing out the conundrums 
that data poses for thinking about jurisdiction. In this Response article, 
therefore, I want to focus on two aspects of the jurisdictional question 
that are largely beyond the scope of her article. First, I think it is useful 
to provide more historical context than her article does both regarding 
early internet cases that pre-date the ones Daskal discusses by fifteen 
years or so, as well as the scholarly literature that arose in the late 
1990s and early 2000s in response to precisely the problems that Daskal 
describes. This context is important, I think, because it suggests that 
the issues Daskal seeks to address are not new, though they may be 
accelerating. Further, the earlier scholarship may actually have more 
to offer than her article acknowledges. Second, and relatedly, although 
Daskal effectively lays out the problems raised by the 
deterritorialization of data, she does not offer much of a roadmap 
regarding new jurisdictional principles that might be developed to 
respond to this changing social reality. And ironically, it may be that 
some of the earlier scholarship on internet jurisdiction might point 
usefully towards such principles. 
Thus, this Response offers both a “look back” and a “look 
forward”: back to the early days of the commercial internet when courts 
and scholars first began wrestling with the problems of data’s 
deterritorialization; and forward to a set of principles that might guide 
legal regimes considering jurisdictional dilemmas in the data-driven 
era in which we find ourselves. 
I.  PLUS ÇA CHANGE… 
Reading Daskal’s article, one might reasonably conclude that 
the issues she raises are new or have only arisen in the past few years. 
Indeed, all of the cases Daskal describes are of relatively recent vintage, 
and though Daskal briefly references early scholarly debate about 
internet jurisdiction, she does so only in passing and essentially 
dismisses that early work as outmoded. However, I think it might be 
useful to go back to some of that early scholarship in order to help frame 
more precisely what it is about data that is or is not different. 
To the extent Daskal references past scholarship on internet 
jurisdiction, she focuses on the seminal 1996 article by David G. Post & 
David Johnson, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace.2 And 
there is a reason for that. This article was the first really to make the 
2. David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
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“data is different” argument in order to surface core legal questions 
about jurisdiction, sovereignty, and legitimacy. Crucially, the article 
made two fundamental points, one descriptive and one normative.   
Descriptively, Johnson & Post argued that online interaction 
increased the likelihood that activity initiated in one location would 
create effects in another location, without regard to territory. As the 
authors put it, information “can be transmitted from one physical 
location to any other location without degradation, decay, or substantial 
delay, and without any physical cues or barriers that might otherwise 
keep certain geographically remote places and people separate from one 
another.”3 This was and remains the essence of the “data is different” 
argument: that physical location may no longer be as relevant with 
regard to electronic data, rendering problematic a world of legal 
jurisdictions based on territorially delimited authority. 
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, Johnson & Post 
argued that, because territorially based sovereigns would inevitably 
face challenges of sovereignty and legitimacy in regulating online 
interaction, we might better think of the online world as its own world 
for jurisdictional purposes. Thus, they argued for the creation of an 
indigenous law of cyberspace, where different service providers and 
websites would compete with each other to offer different rule-sets, and 
users would “vote” for the rule-sets they prefer simply by making 
decisions as to which rule-sets to use.4   
Unfortunately, because this normative claim was relatively easy 
to refute as unrealistic cyber-utopianism, scholars tended to ignore the 
important descriptive claim as well. Daskal falls into this trap. She 
confusingly labels the Johnson & Post position “unterritorialism” and 
then quickly dispatches it to the dustbin as a relic of the early internet 
era. 
But the Johnson & Post argument is neither “unterritorialism” 
nor irrelevant. Indeed, for better or worse, Johnson & Post, far from 
being “unterritorialists,” started from the assumption that control over 
territory was the core principle underlying jurisdiction and sovereignty. 
Indeed, it was precisely this territorialism that, to them, made online 
interaction such a difficult problem for jurisdictional analysis. 
It would therefore be more accurate to call Johnson & Post 
cyberspace exceptionalists.5 They believed that the rise of online 
interaction required new rules for legal jurisdiction by upsetting old 
3. Id. at 1370–71.
4. Id. at 1398–99.
5. This moniker has the added benefit of being the one Post himself adopted. See David G.
Post, Against Cyberanarchy, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002). 
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assumptions about the general tie between legal effects and territorial 
location. And once we view them simply as exceptionalists, there is 
actually a straight line from their work to Patricia Bellia’s 2001 
Chasing Bits Across Borders6 (which even has an almost identical title 
to Daskal’s) to my 2002 article on The Globalization of Jurisdiction7 to 
Daskal’s contention that data is different. 
Of course, even as a descriptive matter one could debate the 
exceptionalist position. For example, Jack Goldsmith argued that 
online activity created no fundamentally new legal problem and that 
“well-settled” principles in existing conflict-of-laws doctrines were 
adequate to address any issues to be resolved.8 As Daskal notes in her 
article, Goldsmith’s successor in advancing the unexceptionalist 
position is Andrew K. Woods, who has made strikingly similar 
arguments to the ones Goldsmith made in the late 1990s.9   
To my mind, however, this dichotomy between exceptionalist 
and unexceptionalist visions was a false one from the start. First, one’s 
perspective on whether the online medium creates a new problem 
depends in large part on what the legal question is. For example, if our 
focus turned from jurisdiction to simply the substantive law of 
defamation, we would note that defamation is generally defined as the 
communication of a false statement about someone with the requisite 
degree of intent. This communication can be written or oral, and if it is 
written, there does not seem to be much of a legal difference whether 
the written defamation is communicated by postal mail, fax, or e-mail. 
It is still defamation, and the online context doesn’t change the legal 
liability question. Thus, unexceptionalism seems to apply to defamation 
law. But when we turn to the question of intermediary liability 
regarding that same defamatory content and ask whether (and under 
what circumstances) various types of internet service providers should 
be held liable for defamatory content accessible through their portals, 
then we have a question that is not easily answered without some 
conceptual understanding of what an internet service provider is or 
should be. Or, if we ask a jurisdictional question about where the 
defamatory act took place or whose discovery rules would govern the 
defamatory e-mail at issue, then again we face core questions about the 
nature of jurisdiction. So, online defamation issues require either an 
exceptionalist or an unexceptionalist approach, depending on what 
aspect of the case one is discussing. 
6. Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35.
7. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002).
8. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
9. See Andrew K. Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729 (2016).
Berman_Galley (Do Not Delete) 2/2/2018  4:27 PM 
16 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:11 
The second reason the dichotomy was unhelpful from the 
beginning is that the unexceptionalist position assumes that there 
actually are well-settled “general” principles of law that can simply be 
applied to new legal settings without alteration. And yet it is the nature 
of law that it changes over time. Thus, what is “well-settled” for one 
generation (or in one century) is apt to be very different from what is 
well-settled for the next. Even more importantly, new technologies that 
alter the culture are precisely the sorts of changes that tend to result in 
shifts to well-settled legal principles.10 
For example, in the nineteenth century, “well-settled” U.S. 
principles of legal jurisdiction and choice of law saw jurisdiction as 
rooted almost exclusively in the territorial power of the sovereign.11 
Each sovereign was deemed to have jurisdiction, exclusive of all other 
sovereigns, to bind persons and things present within its territorial 
boundaries. By the early twentieth century, growth of interstate 
commerce, transportation, and cross-border corporate activity put 
pressure on the idea that a state’s judicial power extended only to its 
territorial boundary. In particular, the invention of the automobile and 
the development of the modern corporation meant that far-away 
entities could inflict harm within a state without actually being present 
there at the time of a lawsuit. Not surprisingly, by the end of the 
twentieth century, it had become “well-settled” in U.S. jurisdiction 
jurisprudence that a state may at least sometimes assert jurisdiction 
over a defendant if the effects of the defendant’s activities are felt within 
the state’s borders, even if the defendant has not literally set foot 
there.12 Likewise, it had become “well-settled” that choice-of-law rules 
could be based on governmental interests or relationships as well as 
territorial connections.13 And, of course, these new “well-settled” rules 
felt as commonsensical and obvious to most judges, lawyers, and 
observers as the more territorialist view felt in the nineteenth century. 
Now, it seems safe to say that jurisdictional, choice-of-law, and 
judgment recognition rules are in flux again, at least in part because of 
online interaction. Indeed, as many of the cases described by Daskal 
suggest, the idea of basing jurisdiction on where effects are felt is 
difficult to apply to online interaction because our social lives are 
increasingly spread out in many different locations, anywhere our data 
10. I discuss such cultural shifts in more detail in PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL 
PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012). 
11. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAW
(1934). 
12. See, e.g., International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW (1971).
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is stored, used, or viewed, and we are potentially affected by activity 
taking place anywhere, without regard to physical territory.  
The answers that law will ultimately evolve to address these 
sorts of problems are difficult to predict, and scholars and judges will 
no doubt have differing approaches to specific questions of jurisdiction, 
choice of law, and judgment recognition regarding online interaction, 
virtual worlds, data storage, digital currencies, autonomous entities, 
and the like. Suffice to say that however one resolves the issues, “well-
settled” principles of law are unlikely to be very helpful because such 
principles are themselves always in flux, often precisely because of the 
pressures placed on such principles by new communications 
technologies such as the internet and new ways in which social lives 
become deterritorialized. Thus, in some sense, a pure unexceptionalist 
position is difficult to maintain. But if unexceptionalists relied too much 
on the application of mythical well-settled principles, the 
exceptionalists, at times, tended to the opposite extreme, assuming that 
the rise of online interaction, data storage and the like upend nearly all 
extant ideas about law and the role of the state. As we have seen in the 
two decades since Johnson & Post wrote their article, state regulation 
of online activity remains a potent force, even allowing for all the 
jurisdictional conundrums they correctly predicted. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, although the cyber-libertarian 
idea of a world of independent rule-sets created by websites has not 
come to pass, even that prediction was not altogether wrong. As 
Daskal’s article makes clear, ubiquitous platforms such as Yahoo!, 
Microsoft, Skype, and Google are frequently being commandeered by 
territorially based sovereign entities to operate as a worldwide 
nonterritorial enforcement mechanism. So the idea that territorially 
based sovereigns would be unable to effectively regulate and would 
therefore need web-based assertions of jurisdiction is now in many 
respects the way things have evolved, for better or worse. And, of 
course, the ongoing battles about the enforceability of online “Terms of 
Service” agreements make clear that online rule-sets still matter. 
Thus, instead of labeling the early scholarship 
“unterritorialism” and then dismissing it as a relic of an earlier cyber-
utopian era, we might more profitably view it as a debate between 
exceptionalists and unexceptionalists about the degree to which settled 
conflict-of-law principles would provide stable solutions to jurisdictional 
issues related to online interaction. Viewed in this way, Daskal’s 
argument for data’s difference looks a little less like a new theory for 
online regulation and a little more like simply the most recent in a line 
of exceptionalist arguments. 
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And it is not just the current scholarly debates that echo the 
debates of two decades ago, but the legal cases as well. Indeed, the 
recent cases Daskal describes reprise many of the dilemmas and 
arguments from the first decade of commercial online activity. As early 
as 1995, a federal district court in Connecticut ruled that it had proper 
jurisdiction over the defendant Instruction Set, a Massachusetts-based 
provider of computer technology, even though Instruction Set 
maintained no offices in Connecticut and did not conduct regular 
business there.14 The court ruled that the defendant’s promotional 
website, because it was accessible in Connecticut, supported the 
exercise of jurisdiction in the state. According to the court, the website 
advertisements were directed to all states within the United 
States. Therefore, Instruction Set had “purposely availed itself of the 
privilege of doing business within Connecticut.”15 This vision looks 
quite a bit like the Belgian assertions of jurisdiction over Yahoo! and 
Skype that Daskal describes.16  
Similarly, we can see that efforts to limit the jurisdictional reach 
of legal decisions over online activity tend to be unsatisfactory. Back in 
2000, a French court asserted jurisdiction over Yahoo! and ordered the 
site to take all possible measures to dissuade and prevent access in 
France to Yahoo! auction sites that sell Nazi memorabilia or other items 
that are sympathetic to Nazism or constitute Holocaust denial.17 
Undisputedly, selling such merchandise in France would violate French 
law,18 and there would have been no jurisdictional dispute had the 
French authorities limited their prosecution to the French end-users 
who were downloading the illegal materials from Yahoo!’s auction sites. 
But even in this early internet era, legal authorities were already 
realizing that it is often far more effective to proceed against an 
intermediary such as Yahoo!, both because the intermediary is usually 
a larger corporate actor and therefore easier to find and because one 
legal action can address a broader problem rather than requiring 
separate enforcement actions against each end-user. In effect, the 
intermediary becomes the enforcement agent of whatever legal 
authority issues the order.  
 
 14. See Inset Sys. Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1966). 
 15. See id. at 164. 
 16. See Daskal, supra note 1, at 192–95. 
 17. See LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc.,Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [hereinafter TGI] [High 
Court of Paris], May 22, 2000, http://lthoumyre.chez.com/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm, 
[https://perma.cc/738B-V9BM]. 
 18. See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] [PENAL CODE], art. R.645-1 (prohibiting the public display of 
Nazi memorabilia except for the purposes of an historical film, show, or exhibit), 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006419560&cidText
e=LEGITEXT000006070719, [https://perma.cc/BL8T-4J3A]. 
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In this case, the intermediary question had two parts, however. 
Certainly the French court had undisputed jurisdictional authority over 
Yahoo.fr, Yahoo!’s French subsidiary, and Yahoo.fr complied with 
requests that access to such sites be blocked.19 What made this action 
noteworthy was that the suit was brought not only against Yahoo.fr, 
but against Yahoo.com, an American corporation, and the court sought 
to enjoin access to non-French websites stored on Yahoo.com’s non-
French servers. Of course, one can easily see why the court and the 
complainants in this action would have taken this additional step. 
Shutting down access to web pages on yahoo.fr does no good at all if 
French citizens can, by entering a slightly different URL in their search 
box, simply go to yahoo.com and access those same pages.  
The Google Spain right-to-be-forgotten case that Daskal 
describes follows a similar pattern.20 Google was willing to de-index 
websites for users using Google’s Spanish portal, google.es, but the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) understandably found that solution 
inadequate because google.com is so easy for Spaniards to access. But, 
as in the Yahoo! case fifteen years earlier, the concern is that de-
indexing for all users, regardless of location, effectively means that the 
ECJ decision is a worldwide injunction, perhaps taking us all the way 
back to the 1995 Instruction Set case discussed above. On the other 
hand, it is easy to see that the extraterritoriality charge runs in both 
directions. If France or Spain is not able to block the access of its citizens 
to proscribed material, then the United States will effectively be 
imposing First Amendment norms on the entire world. And though 
geographical tracking software might seem to solve the problem by 
allowing websites or search engines to offer different content to 
different users, such a solution would still require the sites to analyze 
the laws of all jurisdictions to determine what material to filter for 
which users.  
The arguments in the Yahoo! and Google Spain cases therefore 
are simply reiterations of the basic dichotomy that has been repeated 
over twenty years of jurisdictional jurisprudence. On the one hand, 
legal authorities wish to assert jurisdiction anywhere a community is 
effected by web-based content. This tends to push in the direction of 
universal jurisdiction, because content uploaded anywhere in the world 
can potentially cause harmful effects anywhere else in the world. In 
response, defendants argue for jurisdiction only where content is 
 
 19. See LICRA v. Yahoo!, Inc., TGI, Nov. 20, 2000, http://www.lapres.net/yahen11.html, 
[https://perma.cc/ALK9-XM6A].  
 20. See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Case C-131/12, 
May 13, 2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131, 
[https://perma.cc/2367-44E8]. 
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uploaded or only where their servers are located or only in their home 
jurisdiction. This theory of jurisdiction tends to result either in 
arbitrary or easily manipulable jurisdictional principles (such as where 
a server is located) or a system where actors impacting communities 
across the globe can only be sued or regulated in their home jurisdiction. 
Both of these solutions seem unsatisfying. And finding some other non-
web-based territorial nexus to bolster an assertion of jurisdiction can 
also be problematic. For example, regardless of how one resolves the 
jurisdictional question in the Yahoo! case, it seems clear that where in 
the world the actual paper share certificate by which Yahoo! owned 
Yahoo.fr seems irrelevant to the underlying jurisdictional issues at 
stake. 
II. A COSMOPOLITAN PLURALIST VISION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
So, if Daskal is right (and I believe she is) that data is different 
and is inexorably and inevitably changing settled expectations about 
conflict-of-law rules, what are some of the principles that might help us 
make sense of this brave new world in which we find ourselves? This is 
beyond the scope of Daskal’s article, but again it seems to me that a look 
back might allow us to look forward. In my 2002 article, The 
Globalization of Jurisdiction,21 and my 2005 article Towards a 
Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental 
Interests in a Global Era,22 I argued for a cosmopolitan pluralist 
conception of conflict of laws. I noted that the movement of our social 
activity into various forms of the virtual is a real trend, and it is one 
that is bound to unsettle previously settled legal principles. Yet, a time 
of flux is also a time of opportunity. As judges, legislators, and scholars 
struggle to apply old legal principles to new contexts, they are—in a far 
more self-conscious way than usual—questioning whether those old 
legal principles really work anymore. Such a time of self-conscious 
inquiry opens the conceptual space to allow one to go back to first 
principles and ask important jurisprudential and sociologically charged 
questions that run throughout all of law.  
In addition, moving from the descriptive to the normative, we 
can conceptualize the idea of jurisdiction in a way that might take into 
consideration the contested and constantly shifting process by which 
people imagine communities and their membership in them. Just as a 
rigidly territorial conception of jurisdiction eventually gave way in the 
 
 21. See Berman, supra note 7. 
 22. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining 
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005). 
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first part of the twentieth century to the idea of jurisdiction based on 
contacts with a sovereign entity, so too a contacts-based approach might 
now yield to a conception of jurisdiction based on community affiliation.   
A cosmopolitan23 approach allows us to think of community not 
as a geographically determined territory circumscribed by fixed 
boundaries, but as a set of multiple affiliations held simultaneously.24 
This dynamic understanding of the relationship between the “local” 
community and other forms of community affiliation permits us to 
conceptualize legal jurisdiction in terms of social interactions that are 
fluid processes, not motionless demarcations frozen in time and space. 
A court in one country might therefore appropriately assert community 
dominion over a legal dispute even if the court’s territorially based 
contacts with the dispute are minimal. Conversely, a country that has 
certain “contacts” with a dispute might nevertheless be unable to 
establish a tie between a local community and a distant defendant 
sufficient to justify asserting its dominion. 
A cosmopolitan interrogation of conceptions of community, 
therefore, might rein in some assertions of jurisdiction over distant acts 
while permitting other extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction that 
are currently unrecognized. Accordingly, the cosmopolitan pluralist 
conception of jurisdiction I have proposed seeks to capture a middle 
ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and a system of 
complete universal jurisdiction on the other. In any event, the 
jurisdictional inquiry would no longer be based on a reified counting of 
contacts with, effects on, or interests of a territorially bounded 
population. Rather, courts would take seriously the multiple definitions 
of community that might be available, the symbolic significance of 
asserting jurisdiction over an actor, and the normative desirability of 
conceptualizing the parties before the court as members of the same 
legal jurisdiction. 
In addition, if nation-states are imagined, historically 
contingent communities defined by admittedly arbitrary geographical 
boundaries, and if those nation-states—because of transnational flows 
 
 23. By “cosmopolitan,” I refer to a multivalent perspective that recognizes the wide variety of 
affiliations people feel toward a range of communities, from the most local to the most global. I 
therefore distinguish cosmopolitanism from a universalist vision (often associated with 
cosmopolitanism), which sees people solely, or primarily, as members of one world community. 
Cosmopolitanism, as I use the term, involves an ideal of multiple attachments; it does not 
necessarily entail the erasure of nonglobal community affiliations. See, e.g., Bruce Robbins, 
Introduction Part I: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND 
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 1, 3 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998) (“[I]nstead of an 
ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of (re)attachment, multiple 
attachment, or attachment at a distance.”). 
 24.   See DOREEN MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE, AND GENDER, 154 (1994). 
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of information, capital, and people—no longer define unified 
communities (if they ever did), then there is no conceptual justification 
for conceiving of nation-states as possessing a monopoly on the 
assertion of jurisdiction. Instead, any comprehensive theory of 
jurisdiction must acknowledge that nonstate communities also assert 
various claims to jurisdictional authority and articulate alternative 
norms that are often incorporated into more “official” legal regimes. 
This pluralist25 understanding of jurisdiction helps us to see that law is 
not merely the coercive command of a sovereign power, but a language 
for imagining alternative future worlds. Moreover, various norm-
generating communities (not just the sovereign) are always contesting 
the shape of such worlds. 
Finally, as the survey of cases makes clear, in a world of 
deterritorialized data, the role of intermediaries as lawmakers and law 
enforcers has radically increased. When Facebook enforces Terms of 
Service agreements, or Twitter is asked (or required) to police hate 
speech, or Google implements an ECJ ruling, we can call these acts of 
intermediaries law or not, but a pluralist would argue that it doesn’t 
matter how you define it; the fact is that it affects the behavior of real 
people in the real world. Indeed, the actions of intermediaries can have 
more impact than the sometimes empty commands of a sovereign. A 
pluralist perspective has the advantage of not getting caught up in 
definitions of law but instead recognizing that the quasi law created, 
imposed, and/or applied by nongovernmental entities should remain 
within our legal analytical purview whether we call it law or not.   
III.  BUILDING JURISDICTIONAL RULES IN A DETERRITORIALIZED, DATA-
DRIVEN WORLD 
So, how might we build a conflict-of-laws jurisprudence that 
reflects a world of deterritorialized data? How can we create a 
cosmopolitan pluralist vision that takes account of changing social 
reality without either starting from scratch and throwing out all extant 
conflicts principles on the one hand, or simply assuming current 
doctrine will suffice on the other hand? In short, how can we meld 
exceptionalist and unexceptionalist positions to develop workable 
provisional compromises to govern the ubiquitous virtual worlds of the 
twenty-first century? 
As a true believer in common law case-by-case adjudication, I 
cannot provide a comprehensive code that anticipates all permutations 
 
 25. For a more detailed application of the insights of legal pluralism to conflict-of-laws 
questions, see BERMAN, supra note 10. 
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of human activity and provides a definitive answer. Indeed, one of the 
important lessons of conflict of laws, it seems to me, is that there is no 
single unifying grand theory that can provide an authoritative answer 
to every possible dilemma or account for the infinite variety of human 
activity that may arise. And even if we could, such a grand theory would 
instantly become obsolete as new advances in technology, science, 
communications, and transportation keep galloping on ahead of the 
lumbering efforts of law to catch up.   
Thus, all I can offer is a set of provisional principles that might 
guide the development of conflict-of-laws doctrines. These principles, at 
most, provide a framework for analyzing the knotty conflicts problems 
that deterritorialized data creates: 
A.  The territorial location of data or servers is irrelevant. 
In an era of cloud computing, data can be anywhere. As the 
Microsoft Ireland case26 makes clear, even a simple e-mail message can 
be stored in a location completely unrelated to the sender or recipient 
or even the home of the company that controls the storage. Further, the 
message might not even be stored in one location; its component data 
parts could be split among data warehouses within multiple territorial 
sovereignties. And not only is the location arbitrary, but it is malleable. 
The data can easily be shifted from place to place instantly and 
algorithmically, with no human being even making a conscious decision 
to relocate. Finally, it is the service provider, not the end-user, that 
ultimately controls the data location. Even if an individual lives all her 
life in one territorial location and deposits money in her local branch of 
a multinational financial institution, data related to that account could 
move anywhere, all based on the data storage scheme of the financial 
institution. 
The arbitrary and malleable nature of data storage wreaks 
havoc on jurisdictional systems that rely on territorial location. In 
response, some countries are pursuing legislation that would require 
the localization of data.27 Under these statutes, data related to an 
individual must remain stored within the home country of that 
individual. This strikes me as precisely the wrong way to go about 
solving the problem. It seems to me that, if jurisdictional rules do not 
map well onto the reality of human activity, it’s a sign that 
 
 26. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356 
(2017). 
 27. See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L. J. 677 (2015) 
(surveying data localization implementation and its effects across various countries). 
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jurisdictional rules need to change, not that we need to squelch or limit 
that human activity. 
 
 B.  The place of incorporation of a corporation is potentially 
relevant to the jurisdictional calculus, but should not be determinative. 
Even those who accept that data and server location should not 
determine jurisdiction may balk at the idea that place of incorporation 
should similarly not be determinative. After all, we may think that a 
corporation should be free to choose the state or country by which it is 
regulated. And certainly sometimes the place of incorporation signals 
both a substantive affiliation with that jurisdiction and a willingness to 
submit to that jurisdiction’s laws. 
Yet, sometimes, place of incorporation is just as arbitrary and 
manipulated as data or server location. Individuals with no connection 
with the United States can easily create a U.S. company and then claim 
protection of U.S. law (and U.S. courts) even though nothing about the 
dispute at issue really evinces a connection with the United States. 
Likewise, in the internet taxation context, corporations can choose to 
incorporate in a foreign jurisdiction and potentially skirt local tax laws 
even if most of the corporation’s revenue derives from that local 
jurisdiction. Creating a subsidiary can also shield a corporation from 
liability. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to permit a 
state to assert jurisdiction over a foreign parent company selling 
products locally solely because the sale passed through a third 
corporation that acted as the U.S. distributor.28 But the third-party 
corporation in this case wasn’t truly independent; it was essentially just 
a subsidiary corporation with an exclusive arrangement to distribute 
the foreign corporation’s products in the United States.29 Thus, if 
jurisdiction is automatically tied to place of incorporation without any 
further analysis of the underlying social or economic reality, distortions 
may result. 
C.  Community affiliation is a more plausible basis for legal 
jurisdiction than contacts with a territorially based sovereign. 
Instead of relying on arbitrary, manipulable, and 
nonsubstantive connections to a forum, such as data location, server 
location, or place of incorporation, community affiliation provides a 
 
 28. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 29. Id. at 896–98 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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potentially more appropriate test for jurisdiction and choice of law in 
the twenty-first century. The question then becomes to what extent 
have the parties taken steps to associate themselves with a particular 
community, and to what extent is the lawsuit in question related to the 
concerns of a particular community? 
A community affiliation test provides a more satisfactory way of 
analyzing cases such as Microsoft Ireland. Rather than looking at where 
the underlying data happens to be located, the relevant question would 
be the location and/or nationality of the actual user whose information 
the government wants to search or the corporation from which the 
government is seeking the information.  
D.  Trying to serve a market is a more relevant jurisdictional hook than 
targeting a territory. 
In a world of deterritorialized data and multinational corporate 
activity, it can be difficult to determine when a corporation has targeted 
a particular jurisdiction. For example, were the Yahoo! auction sites 
that were selling Holocaust denial and Nazi memorabilia material 
targeting French customers? Or, to ask a different question, was 
Yahoo.com explicitly targeting French customers? After all, many 
websites are simply accessible in many different jurisdictions without 
particularly targeting any one of them. Accordingly, it seems odd if a 
desire to access a global market would allow a company to avoid 
jurisdiction in any particular jurisdiction just because no one 
jurisdiction was explicitly targeted. Yet, that is precisely what a 
plurality of United States Supreme Court justices would have ruled in 
the recent case of J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro.30 In that case, 
the Court overturned the jurisdictional assertion of a state over a 
corporation. The plurality did so on the ground that the corporation had 
not explicitly targeted that particular state.31 But, as the dissent 
pointed out, the company was aiming to exploit a national market and 
so the fact that it wasn’t targeting any particular state should not deny 
the state a basis for asserting jurisdiction.32 Indeed, for a global product 
offered on an undifferentiated basis to multiple markets, it can be 
difficult to determine whether the product is truly being targeted 
anywhere. 
In contrast, a community affiliation analysis would allow an 
inquiry into whether a party is attempting to serve a particular 
 
 30. See 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 31. Id. at 884–85 (Kennedy J., plurality opinion). 
 32. Id. at 893–94 (Ginsburg J., dissenting). 
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community or market its products there. Thus, community affiliation 
would provide a more satisfying way of justifying the Belgian assertion 
of jurisdiction over Yahoo!33 and Skype34 or the ECJ35 or Canadian36 
assertions of jurisdiction over Google. In all of those cases, the service 
provider is making a sustained effort to access a major commercial 
market as part of the companies’ continuous and systematic global 
business strategy. Thus, those companies are purposely affiliating 
themselves with the foreign markets, and regulation by those 
communities is potentially justifiable. 
E.  The size, sophistication, and economic breadth of an actor is 
relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. 
As noted previously, since the very first internet jurisdiction 
cases in the mid-1990s, courts and commentators have struggled with 
what seem to be two unpalatable jurisdictional options: either 
jurisdiction is only legitimate where the operator of the website is 
located or jurisdiction is potentially appropriate wherever the website 
is viewable. The first option allows for regulatory evasion and the 
second pushes towards a form of universal jurisdiction. Indeed, part of 
what concerns commentators about the Belgian court decisions in the 
Yahoo! and Skype cases is that, as articulated by the courts, the 
rationale seems to sweep so broadly.37 
But there is no necessary reason that the hypothetical case of an 
individual posting on a personal website or Facebook page needs to be 
treated the same as Yahoo! posting on its homepage. Indeed, as Justice 
Breyer has recognized, the possible types of internet transaction are so 
varied that it is difficult to create one overarching rule.38 He posits a 
coffee farmer in Kenya selling artisanal coffee online in small quantities 
and contrasts that with a large multinational industrialist selling 
thousands of units per year.39 Even if both products cause harm abroad, 
 
 33. Public Prosecutor v. Yahoo!, Inc., Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation] [Supreme 
Court of Belgium], Dec. 1, 2015, No. P.13.2082.N (Belg.), translated in 13 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & 
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 156 (2016). 
 34. Public Prosecutor v. Skype, Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First 
Instance], Mechelen, Oct. 27, 2016, No. ME 20.4.1 105151-12, ¶¶ 1.2-1.5 (Belg.), 
http://www.wolterskluwer.be/files/communities/legalworld/rechtspraak/2016/Corr.%20Mechelen
%2027%20oktober%202016%20(Skype).pdf [https://perma.cc/C5Z7-EZ9Y]. 
 35. See Google Spain, supra note 20. 
 36. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, Inc., [2017] S.C.R. 34 (Can.), https://scc-
csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16701/index.do [https://perma.cc/6JE4-GBSU]. 
 37. Daskal, supra note 1, at 195. 
 38. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891–92 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 39. See id. 
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there is no reason that both defendants need to be treated identically 
for jurisdictional purposes. 
Community affiliation analysis provides a way out of this 
seeming conundrum. A large industrialist seeking to sell multiple units 
on a regular basis as part of a global business plan and earning 
substantial revenue in the process is trying to access a community in a 
way that is very different from me as a professor posting my thoughts 
on a personal webpage. Certainly my thoughts may constitute hate 
speech or libel or copyright infringement in some foreign jurisdiction. 
But that does not mean that I have affiliated myself with that distant 
community or in any way sought to access it. 
F.  The effects of activities can provide a plausible basis for the 
assertion of jurisdiction, even without a territorial nexus. 
Notwithstanding community affiliation (or the lack of it), there 
might be some extreme cases where a community might justifiably wish 
to assert jurisdiction over a distant act or actor based on the egregious 
impact of the act on that community. Harm from pollution is the 
example that immediately springs to mind. It is easy to imagine a 
company in one country dumping toxic waste into a river, which then 
flows downstream and causes harm to communities in a different 
country. In such a circumstance, one can readily imagine the 
downstream community wishing to assert jurisdiction.  
The tricky question is how far to extend this sort of jurisdictional 
rationale that is based on effects. Taken to an extreme, it could swallow 
up all the other rules and lead to universal jurisdiction because an act 
in one place could always potentially cause harm somewhere else. So, 
as noted above, any assertion of purely effects-based jurisdiction should 
also consider all the other factors described: community affiliation, 
effort to exploit a market, size of company, and so on. And although it 
is impossible to predict all the potential factual settings in which this 
question may arise, the point is that these factors should at least temper 
the potential problems associated with jurisdiction based only on 
effects. 
G.  Enforcing a judgment through a powerful intermediary is not 
inherently illegitimate, but the resulting intermediary enforcement 
must be regulated, not simply delegated.   
Governments have always enacted regulation through powerful 
intermediaries. For example, if regulatory authorities want passengers 
in automobiles to use seat belts, they can regulate seatbelt use directly, 
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but they can also require automobile manufacturers to have the car 
make annoying chiming sounds if the car is moving with the seatbelt 
unbuckled. Such intermediary regulation is likely to be far more 
effective because it does not require constant surveillance by state 
actors. 
On the other hand, in the context of data intermediaries, the 
regulation can, as we see in the Google Spain case, turn the 
intermediary into a quasi-adjudicative administrative agency.40 Such a 
move solves enforcement issues, because Google can apply the ECJ 
legal order effectively around the globe without constant monitoring or 
jurisdictional difficulties. But it leads to two interrelated questions. 
First, is the burden placed on intermediaries appropriate? And second, 
might intermediary enforcement regimes lead to overenforcement? 
As to the first question, the burden is surely great. In the first 
two years or so after the ruling was issued, Google reportedly received 
528,756 requests and evaluated 1,634,370 URLs for removal.41 And of 
course, it’s not as if the ECJ criteria provided clear bright lines to apply. 
Many decisions will therefore require interpretation and careful legal 
analysis. And parties unhappy with Google’s decision can then 
challenge the decision in court, leading to more expense for Google. 
Yet, I am inclined to think that this is simply the cost of doing 
business when one has essentially become a monopoly common carrier 
for online search. Certainly, if Google wants to withdraw from the 
European commercial scene, it could extricate itself from the ECJ 
judgment, but undoubtedly the company has performed a cost-benefit 
analysis and decided that it’s worth it to continue providing search 
services to European end-users.  
The second question is more troubling. After all, if someone 
contacts Google to request de-indexing under the ECJ decision, it is 
surely far easier for Google to err on the side of granting the de-indexing 
request rather than risk the aggrieved party challenging Google in 
court. Thus, although the ECJ decision tries to balance individual 
privacy concerns with the need to maintain free access to truthful 
information, it is highly likely that, over time, enforcing that balance 
through Google will tend to err on the privacy side and de-emphasize 
the countervailing value of protecting public informational access. 
 
 40. See Google Spain, supra note 20.  
 41. Guy Vassall-Adams & Jacob P. Goldstein, Presentation at the MLRC Media Law 
Conference September 2016: Google Spain and the Right to Be Forgotten Two Years Later, 3 (July 
2016) (outline available at http://www.medialaw.org/component/k2/item/3538-google-spain-and-
the-right-to-be-forgotten-two-years-later?tmpl=component&print=1) [https://perma.cc/U4W2-
YQAK]. 
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For this reason, a decision like the one the Canadian Supreme Court 
reached in Equustek,42 though structurally similar to the ECJ decision, 
is less problematic. In that case, the court ordered Google to de-index a 
defined and limited set of web pages, which Google can do quickly and 
mechanically without requiring teams of attorneys making interpretive 
judgments. Moreover, the pages to be de-indexed were sales sites, not 
principally sites providing public information. Thus, if the ECJ or other 
courts are going to ask large data intermediaries to have common-
carrier-like responsibilities, they must either define the scope of the 
enforcement order narrowly or provide ongoing oversight, monitoring, 
and guidance so that the intermediary is not making too many 
discretionary legal decisions on behalf of government. 
H. Terms of Service agreements will not necessarily resolve jurisdiction 
and choice-of-law decisions. 
One way of trying to solve knotty online jurisdictional or choice-
of-law problems is to fall back on contractual forum selection or choice-
of-law clauses. This is a tempting solution, particularly because most 
interactions between end-users and intermediaries are at least 
nominally governed by Terms of Service agreements, those “click 
through” contracts that most users never read, but simply agree to in 
order to gain entrance to the site they are accessing. If such Terms of 
Service agreements are enforced, they can solve many potential 
jurisdictional and choice-of-law problems. But should they be enforced? 
And who gets to make the enforcement decision? It turns out that both 
of these questions can prove problematic.   
To begin, there are many reasons that Terms of Service 
agreements might not be enforced. First, the agreements are not true 
bargained-for exchanges. Rather, they are so-called “contracts of 
adhesion” that are more accurately analyzed as part of the product itself 
and therefore perhaps subject to a kind of implied warranty of 
merchantability or a general consumer protection law governing 
deception.43 Thus, substantively unfair terms in such a Terms of Service 
agreement might be deemed unconscionable.44 Second, some courts will 
not allow parties to bargain around local law by choosing a foreign 
forum or foreign law to adjudicate their dispute.45 Third, courts might 
recast a jurisdictional dispute as a disagreement about the validity of 
 
 42. See Google v. Equustek Solutions, supra note 36. 
 43. For an argument along these lines, see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: 
THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2014). 
 44. See, e.g., Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Ca. 2002). 
 45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a). 
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the Terms of Service agreement itself, which is a disagreement that can 
be decided based on forum law, not the law called for in the agreement.46 
After all, if the contract is invalid, then so is that contract’s forum 
selection or choice-of-law clause. And fourth, courts might recast the 
dispute in the case as a tort or an issue of criminal law or evidence or 
some other noncontractual regime.47 Once recharacterized in this way, 
the dispute becomes one that can be decided without reference to any 
contractual agreement. 
Beyond the question of whether the contract will be enforced is 
the additional uncertainty regarding which court is even making the 
enforcement decision in the first place. After all, the four inquiries 
summarized above concerning the validity of the Terms of Service 
agreement are all likely to be made by the forum court using local law 
(that is, the court and law the plaintiff chose) regardless of what the 
forum selection or choice-of-law clauses say. This is because, again, the 
initial determination of contract validity cannot be made using the 
contract’s own forum selection or choice-of-law clause; that would 
require assuming the validity of the contract, the very issue that is 
being questioned.       
I.  The decision regarding whether to enforce another jurisdiction’s 
judgment is not the same as the decision regarding whether to issue 
that judgment in the first instance. 
When faced with an enforcement decision regarding a foreign 
judgment, courts should not necessarily assume that their own local 
public policies trump the dictates of the foreign judgment. Instead, 
courts must undertake a nuanced inquiry concerning whether the 
affiliations of the parties render the original court judgment legitimate. 
Although the local policies of the forum country are not irrelevant, those 
policies should be weighed against the overall systemic interest in 
creating an interlocking system of international adjudication. 
This is not so different from what courts within federal-style 
systems already do in domestic cases raising judgment recognition 
issues. For example, the United States Supreme Court has long held 
that states cannot refuse to enforce sister-state judgments on the 
ground that doing so would violate the rendering state’s public policy.48 
 
 46. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2015) (discussing this issue).  
 47. See, e.g., Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., 462 Ma. 164 (2012) (using state Wage Act law to govern 
employment contract rather than the law specified in the contract).  
 48. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (making clear that there is no 
public policy exception to the full faith and credit due judgments). 
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Likewise, the ECJ has attempted to lay down a strong rule of judgment 
recognition that allows courts to interpose only European public policies 
to avoid recognizing the judgment of another member state, not their 
own parochial public policies.49 
Of course, within a single, relatively homogenous country, the 
idea of one state enforcing another state’s judgment does not seem quite 
so significant because the variations from state to state are likely to be 
relatively minor. Yet, while the decision to enforce a judgment surely 
will be less automatic when the judgment at issue was rendered by a 
court of a different nation-state, many of the same principles still are 
relevant. Most importantly, what we might call “conflicts values” 
should be part of the judgment recognition calculus. Thus, courts should 
acknowledge the importance of participating in an interlocking 
international legal system, where litigants cannot simply avoid 
unpleasant judgments by relocating. Indeed, there is no need for 
inherent suspicion of foreign judgments. Certainly deference to other 
courts will have long-term reciprocal benefits. And, particularly when 
the parties have no significant affiliation with the forum state, there is 
little reason for a court to insist on following domestic public policies in 
the face of such competing conflicts values. 
This is not to say, of course, that foreign judgments should 
always be enforced. Indeed, even in a cosmopolitan system, one would 
expect that judges might sometimes interpose local public policies 
where they would not in the domestic state-to-state setting. But if we 
acknowledge the importance of the conflicts values effectuated by 
strong judgment recognition, we will necessarily reject the idea that a 
court is simply unable to enforce a judgment just because such a 
judgment could not have been issued by the court in the first instance. 
Instead, we will appreciate that enforcing a foreign judgment is 
fundamentally different from issuing an original judgment; indeed, 
judgment recognition implicates an entirely distinct set of concerns 
about the role of courts in a multijurisdictional world.  
CONCLUSION 
Of course, these nine principles, neither taken on their own nor 
in combination, will completely solve the conflicts problems raised by 
the increasing deterritorialization of data. Indeed, there are no perfect 
 
 49. See Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi & Robert Caldararu v. 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, 2016 E.C.R. 198, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d57f798913232b45cabe6aab2cf36bb51b.e34KaxiLc3eQc40La
xqMbN4PaNqRe0?text=&docid=175547&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=253357 [https://perma.cc/2H7U-7BT4]. 
Berman_Galley (Do Not Delete) 2/2/2018  4:27 PM 
32 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:11 
solutions, and the factual settings whereby these sorts of problems may 
arise are so multifaceted and unpredictable that trying to develop a 
comprehensive set of rules to govern all eventualities strikes me as a 
fool’s errand. Moreover, even if we could discover a grand scheme for 
handling these questions, it is unlikely that all communities in the 
world (or their judicial bodies) would agree. Therefore, no amount of 
analysis will ever wipe out the reality of legal pluralism and its 
attendant uncertainties. 
Nevertheless, it is incumbent on legal scholars today to 
recognize the new challenges arising in this increasingly data-driven 
world and to build new cosmopolitan pluralist legal models that may, 
over time, become simply the way we conceptualize law in the twenty-
first century. As Daskal’s article makes clear, the deterritorialization of 
data requires us to think differently about law’s attachment to physical 
objects in physical space as the basis for legal jurisdiction. And as we 
enter the next two decades of legal scholarship surrounding the 
internet, it is clear that the fundamental challenges identified in the 
late 1990s are still in flux. Thus, the new settled expectations that may 
ultimately emerge are at this moment still contested and uncertain. 
Creative scholars such as Daskal and others will therefore need to keep 
pushing for new approaches that bring our system of law into better 
dialogue with our ever-changing social reality.  
 
